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ABSTRACT 
ABSTRACT 
Infectious disease authorities are warning of a virus with potential to cause a 
human pandemic. The H5Nl virus is possibly endemic is certain areas, with the ability 
oranimartohumantransiiiissiori among tliosetha:t·comeirielose contact. Tlie.H5Nr 
virus is spreading rapidly through wild and domestic flocks and shows no signs of 
slowing its progress (DHHS, 2006). 
In response to the threat, the White House and the Department of Health and 
Human Services (DHHS) have created the Health and Human Services Pandemic 
Influenza Plan (DHHS, 2005a) and the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza (HSC, 
2005). The National Strategy is a general document that seeks to provide general 
guidance for local planning. The DHHS 2005a plan is a large document that both 
outlines the expected federal government's roles and activities during all phases of a 
pandemic, and serves as a template for local governments to develop their own plans. 
A Review and Analysis of the National Pandemic Influenza Plan 
Well before the terrorist attacks in 2001, local governments have been preparing 
for natural and manmade disasters. However, the 2001 attacks opened the eyes of the 
public and the Federal Government that we are vulnerable to large scale foreign terrorist 
attacks on United States soil. Subsequently, funding available to local governments for 
terrorist preparedness and response has increased dramatically. However, an old and 
simple communicable disease threat has reemerged recently that has gotten the attention 
of policy makers from the White House to the local Boards of Health. The H5N1 avian 
influenza virus has become endemic in the poultry and wild bird population in Asia and 
has been found in animals from Asia to the Middle East to Africa and even 
Europe.(DHHS, 2006) This virus has caused death and illness in a limited amount of 
humans and has been especially deadly to those who contract it.(WHO, 2006a) 
Background on Influenza- Influenza is caused by a virus containing eight 
segments of single strand RNA The outer shell of the virus is covered by spikes of two 
different proteins, hemagglutnin and neuraminidase. Influenza viruses are classified as 
A, B or C, depending on their protein composition. The A type virus is thought to be 
responsible for all pandemics. B and C type viruses circulate but are not as virulent and 
cause mild respiratory infections (Diseases, 2005). Interpandemic strains of influenza, or 
seasonal influenza, infect, on average 5%-20% of Americans every year. More than 
200,000 are hospitalized and more than 36,000 die from the interpandemic influenza in 
the United States (DHHS, 2005b ). 
Many people confuse the "flu" with various other viruses that cause just stomach 
problems that can clear your system within 24 hours. The Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) lists the following as standard symptoms of influenza: high fever, 
headache, extreme tiredness, dry cough, sore throat, runny or stuffy nose, muscle aches 
and stomach symptoms which usually only occur in children. mplications from the flu 
virus range from bacterial pneumonia to dehydration and a worsening of an existing 
chronic medical condition such as heart failure and diabetes (DHHS, 2005b ). Influenza 
mainly attacks the upper respiratory tract and is easily passed from person to person by 
droplets excreted when infected individuals cough or sneeze. Individuals may take one to 
four days to develop symptoms while continuing to shed viruses. Influenza virus can 
survive outside the body longer in cold, dry weather which explains why seasonal 
influenza appears in the winter in temperate climates (WHO, 2003). 
Influenza occurs naturally in wild aquatic birds and causes little harm to these 
carriers. Occasionally, such as with the current epizootic H5Nl avian virus in much of 
the world, the virus jumps to domesticated ducks and then to chickens. Normally, the 
virus will make a jump to pigs where it can combine with a human form of influenza. If 
a pig is infected with both an avian and human form, the RNA strands can mix, creating a 
brand new version (Diseases, 2005). Humans and birds alike would not possess 
antibodies to this new virus, causing an outbreak. Several factors then determine the 
severity of the outbreak, including how well the virus is passed from one person to 
another and how virulent it is. 
Drift and Shift- Influenza viruses change through one of two methods. Small 
changes in A and B types occur when the virus copies itself, causing a slight change to 
the protein structure. This is called antigenic drift. This phenomenon is behind seasonal 
outbreaks of influenza and is why vaccines are reformulated every season. The slight 
change in protein structure makes the virus different enough to your body's immune 
system that it is unrecognizable. 
Dramatic changes in Type A influenza are called antigenic shift. The shift occurs 
when a cell is infected by two types of influenza and the RNA of both are combined. 
This creates a completely new subtype of influenza that no one has been exposed to 
before. These shifts are associated with severe flu epidemics or pandemics (Diseases, 
2005). 
Naming the virus- The two proteins, hemagglutnin and neuraminidase which 
make up the protein spikes on the outer shell of the virus are used to name Type A 
viruses. There have been sixteen hemagglutnin and neuraminidase subtypes identified 
and nine neuraminidase subtypes identified. The beginning ofthe name will start with 
the type, which is always A. Next, is the location it was first identified, the lab ID that 
discovered it, the year discovered and the protein combination on the surface. The 
current avian flu threat was discovered first in 1997, in Hong Kong. It has subtype 5 
hemagglutnin and subtype I neuraminidase. Its name is A/Hong Kong/156/97 (H5N1) 
(Diseases, 2005). 
Spanish Influenza 1918 Pandemic- In 1918, a pandemic influenza swept the 
globe and by the end of 1919, an estimated 500 million people, or one third of the 
humans on the planet, showed signs of the illness (WH, 1920). Archived tissue samples 
have provided the gene sequence of the 1918 virus and it has been determined that most 
seasonal and pandemic strains since are descendants ofthat virus. Taubenberger and 
Morens have dubbed this virus, the "mother of all pandemics" (Taubenberger, 2006). 
The pandemic had three distinct waves; the first was relatively small and did not raise 
any concern. The second, coming in the fall of 1918, was the strongest and it subsided 
around Christmas 1918. A third wave started up in February. Figure 1 is a graphic 
showing the pandemic waves based on data from the United Kingdom (Jordan, 1927) 
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Figure 1. Three pandemic waves: weekly combined influenza and 
pneumonia mortality, United Kingdom, 1918-1919 (Jordan, 1927) 
The 1918 influenza, also called the Spanish flu, claimed anywhere from 21 to 40 
million people (Crosby, 1989). Most influenza seriously affects the very young and the 
very old. The Spanish flu had a unique characteristic in that is did not discriminate 
between ages and there was a measurable increase in the amount of mortality in adults 
(Schoch-Spana, 2000). Figure 2 below shows two curves on a graph. The solid line is 
the death rate across all ages for the Spanish flu pandemic and the dotted line is for the 
six years of seasonal flu prior to the pandemic. 
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Figure 2. "U-" and "W -" shaped combined influenza and pneumonia 
mortality, by age at death, per 100,000 persons in each age 
group, United States, 1911-1918. Influenza- and pneumonia specific 
death rates are plotted for the interpandemic years 
1911-1917 (dashed line) and for the pandemic year 1918 (solid 
line) (Taubenberger, 2006) 
At this time in medicine, the influenza virus had not been identified. Doctors and 
public health officials did not even know what they were dealing with and therefore could 
not offer proper advice for citizens to protect themselves. Many types of bacteria were 
mentioned as culprits and did cause many fatal cases of bacterial pneumonia. Other 
theories included foul atmosphere from the rotting corpses from World War One, a covert 
German biological weapon, spiritual malaise and poverty (Schoch-Spana, 2000). When 
the second wave hit the United States, there was serious impact to the delivery of 
essential government and industrial services. Sanitation, law enforcement, fire fighting 
and even postal delivery were impacted due to a high rate of employee absenteeism. 
Since the cause of the illnesses could not be identified and its ease of transmission, many 
people were afraid to venture outside (Schoch-Spana, 2000). 
1957: Asian Influenza (H2N2)- In 1933, the first influenza virus in humans was 
isolated (W. Smith, 1933). It was speculated that the same type of virus could be 
responsible for the 1918 pandemic. This was not the popular opinion until the 1957 
pandemic occurred and the H2N2 virus was identified. This virus spread rapidly but did 
not have the same results as the 1918 pandemic. Influenza based pneumonia was found 
but instead of in all age groups, just those with underlying lung or heart disease 
(Kilbourne, 2006). During this outbreak, the virus was identified and a vaccine was 
produced to protect the public. It arrived in the United States in the summer of 1957 and 
flourished in the school children population once school started in September. A second 
wave in the elderly emerged around January 1958, further proving the cyclical nature of 
pandemics (Muriera, 2006). This virus became endemic once the population created a 
sufficient antibody to the virus. 
1968: Hong Kong Influenza (H3N2)- This virus popped up only eleven years 
after the Asian pandemic. This pandemic was not as widespread as its predecessors, and 
had a varying degree of mortality depending on the location. The United States saw a 
higher than normal mortality rate, while Europe saw a high infection rate but no change 
from seasonal influenza death rates. Many attribute the pocket breakouts to similarity to 
the Asian virus. The hemagglutnin protein changed but the neuraminidase stayed the 
same subtype (JL Schulman, 1969). This could have provided many people the partial 
immunity to the Hong Kong strain. Also, improvements to the medical field and 
antibiotics prevented most bacterial pneumonia cases. 
1976 Fort Dix Swine Flu Epidemic- In 1976, soldiers at Fort Dix in New Jersey 
came down with the H3N2 virus, responsible for the Hong Kong pandemic and the H1N1 
virus, thought to be responsible for the 1918 pandemic. The US goverrunent acted 
quickly, created a vaccine and started the National Immunization Program. 43,000,000 
people were to be vaccinated against this threat, which had the potential to be very 
dangerous. The influenza never left Fort Dix, and the vaccine program was abandoned 
(JL Schulman, 1969). Some questions will never be answered in regards to this incident. 
I. Was the outbreak contained through proper public health actions, such as 
quarantine and hand washing or was it a hoax? 
2. Were the vaccine's effective in containing the outbreak? 
3. Did the outbreak die out only because the proper environmental conditions did not 
exist? 
Public Health officials see this episode as a time when they may have acted too slowly or 
over reacted. Richard Krause, a member of National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases (NIAID) Infectious Disease Committee in 1976 writes that," You will be in a 
fog, and you will need to exercise the best judgment you can on the basis of available 
surveillance information and historical context." (Krause, 2006) Krause defends his 
committee's decision to not only make the vaccine but administer it and not just stockpile 
it incase the epidemic spreads. Currently, public health officials in the WHO and in Asia 
are making these decisions, to prevent the spread ofH5Nl. 
Pandemics of the past versus the present- Often, a potential pandemic is 
described in two versions, a catastrophic version similar to the 1918 pandemic or a mild 
pandemic like either the 1957 or 1968 pandemics. Possibly due to improvements in 
healthcare, surveillance, existence of vaccines, an improved public health system and the 
increased use of soap and water to for prevention, the 1957 and 68 pandemics did not 
have the same effect as the 1918 pandemic. The importance of vaccines have been 
thoroughly proven (Temte, 2006) in controlling influenza but the effects of a pandemic 
on the economy, infrastructure and the healthcare system are not clear. In 1918, the 
healthcare system was inundated and patient needs exceeded capacity. The lower death 
rate and improved response in the two more recent pandemics could also be a sign that 
the current threat is not much of a threat at all. Antibiotics were not available during the 
1918 pandemic to combat secondary bacterial pneumonias, which are available now 
(Bonten MJM, 2006). In 1918, simple habits such as hand washing were not known to 
help prevent transmission. Most citizens lived very close to each other in urban areas or 
out by themselves in rural parts of the country. Now, most of our public is spread out in 
suburbia which could help slow or prevent rapid spread. In this age of high tech 
laboratory facilities, rapid data sharing, improved surveillance and top notch healthcare, 
we will not know how bad a pandemic will be until the virus shows itself. 
Current pandemic threat- Webster's defines pandemic as "occurring over a wide 
geographic area and affecting an exceptionally high proportion of the population" 
("Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary", 2006). Since 1997, the H5Nl virus has been 
spreading throughout chickens, ducks and wild bird throughout Asia, Africa and Europe. 
Since it has spread over half the globe, it could be described as a bird pandemic, but its 
spread and ability to pass to humans has made it a prime candidate to cause a human 
pandemic in the near future (HSC, 2005). It is impossible to determine if the H5Nl virus 
will cause a pandemic in humans, but based on its ability to pass to many types of 
animals and its high mortality rate in the few human infections so far, it bears 
consideration. Figure 3 below shows the cumulative number of confirmed human cases 
of avian influenza A/(H5N1) reported to WHO as of March I 0, 2006 (WHO, 2006a). 
Figure 3-10 March 2006 
Country 
According to this data, some countries have experienced 100% mortality, while globally, 
the morality rate has been 54.2%. It is important to note that the countries listed above 
do not have the type of health care systems that exists in the United States, most cases 
occurring in remote farming communities. However, the virulence ofthe H5Nl virus 
deserves our attention and the possibility of a pandemic has forced our government from 
the federal to local level to re-examine their plans and procedures to handle an emergency 
such as a pandemic. Very few people still alive remember the 1918 pandemic and the 
other pandemics were small enough to not have a significant impact on the memories of 
either our leaders or the general public. 
World Health Organization Global Influenza Preparedness Plan- The World 
Health Organization (WHO) was created in 1947 by the United Nations (UN) to serve as 
the health arm of the UN. It primary purpose," is the attainment by all peoples of the 
highest possible level ofhealth."(WHO, 2006b) The WHO can be seen as the 
coordinating health department for the international community. Any pandemic will 
involve just about every country on the planet and a coordinated response is paramount to 
being able to reduce mortality and morbidity. The WHO released in 2005, the WHO 
Global Influenza Preparedness Plan (WHO, 2005) which; 
1. Describes the new six stages of a pandemic 
2. Outlines the WHO's responsibilities 
3. Provides its member states a guide to prepare their own plans which mirror both 
each other and the WHO's plan. 
At each stage of the pandemic, the plan provides both suggested goals and activities for 
governments to use to develop their own preparedness plans. The six stages of a 
pandemic as defined by the WHO are (WHO, 2005); 
I. Phase 1-No new influenza subtypes in humans, Possible infection of some 
animals 
2. Phase 2- No new subtypes of virus but current animal virus poses a significant 
risk to humans. 
3. Phase 3- Human infection with new subtype but no human to human 
transmission. 
4. Phase 4- Small clusters of human to human transmission, but highly localized. 
5. Phase 5- Larger clusters but human to human transmission remains localized 
6. Phase 6- Sustained transmission globally. 
Phases 1 and 2 are the interpandemic phases, 3-5 are the Pandemic Alert period and the 
last phase constitutes the pandemic period. All of the WHO's recommendations are 
based on experience from both past pandemics and seasonal outbreaks of influenza. It 
also was developed by a large international group of researchers, doctors and public 
health officials. 
The Federal Response in the United States- Using the WHO plan as a guide, the 
executive branch of the federal government created two documents at the end of2005, to 
lay out the national plan for pandemic preparedness and response. The first was the 
National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza (HSC, 2005), published by the Homeland 
Security Council in the White House. Quoting directly from the document," The 
National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza guides our preparedness and response to an 
influenza pandemic, with the intent of (1) stopping, slowing or otherwise limiting fhe 
spread of a pandemic to the United States; (2) limiting the domestic spread of a 
pandemic, and mitigating disease, suffering and death; and (3) sustaining infrastructure 
and mitigating impact to the economy and the functioning of society (HSC, 2005)." The 
Strategy has three 'Pillars" which are used to group activities into functional areas. The 
"Pillars" are; 
I. Preparedness and Communication 
• Planning 
• Communicating Expectations and Responsibilities 
• Production and Stockpiling of vaccines and antiviral medications 
• Distribution plans for vaccine and antiviral medications 
• Advancing scientific knowledge 
2. Surveillance and Detection 
• Ensuring Rapid Reporting of Outbreaks 
• Surveillance to limit spread 
3. Response and Containment 
• Containing Outbreaks 
• Leveraging national medical and public health surge capacity 
• Sustaining infrastructure, essential services and the economy 
• Ensuring risk communication 
The Strategy closes by outlining the responsibilities to every group from international 
partners to individual citizens. The document does not address funding or a timeline 
because many of the activities would not take place until an outbreak actually occurs. 
The following day, Secretary Leavitt released the HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan 
(DHHS, 2005a). This monstrous, 398 page plan provides the detail to support the 
National Strategy. It describes in detail the responsibilities of each agency within the 
Department of Health and Human Services, as well as the rest of the federal government. 
It adequately describes the importance of working with international as well as local 
partners to first attempt to contain an outbreak and if uncontainable, provide the best 
response to sustain and protect life. The second section expands on the guidance from 
the WHO plan for state and local governments to develop their own pandemic response 
plans. An important piece of this plan is the inclusion of the National Response Plan 
(DHS, 2004). In 2003, the President released Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive/HSPD-5 (House, 2003) which directed DHS to develop the National Response 
Plan and forced all state and local governments to design all local emergency plans 
around this plan to be eligible for federal assistance. The HHS plan details how local 
governments can design their plan to match the NRP and use the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) to make interagency interaction and assistance easier. 
Key federal actions will be based around containment and development of a 
vaccine and antiviral stockpile program. In addition to national disease surveillance, the 
federal government hopes to prevent its introduction to US soil by containing it in other 
countries. This requires the presence of the CDC in the third world; to protect our assets 
and to work with international partners and the WHO to improve surveillance and 
healthcare in third world countries where pandemics typically start. Moszynski writes in 
. the BMJ that in places like Africa \'/here the health care system is ahnost non-existent and 
current health efforts are focused on AIDS. polio and dysentery, avian flu may not get the 
attention it deserves and may create an environment that allows it io flourish before it can· 
be contained (Moszynski, 2006). It may be inappropriate to put much faith in a certain 
country's ability to adequately identify and contain an outbreak. On an international 
level, countries that can assist in the surveillance effort should coordinate with the WHO 
by bolstering third world efforts in an attempt to limit the spread and prevent a pandemic. 
Public health has proven that prevention is more cost effective than treatment but the 
HHS plan seems to put more effort into other parts of its plan. The President's proposed 
budget only earmarks $251 million to international disease surveillance out of a 7.1 
billion dollar request (Halliman, 2005). 
Within the Unites States, the issue of surveillance and containment will fall on the 
laps oflocal health departments. The HSPD-5 confirms that any event is first and 
foremost the responsibility of the local government where it is occurring (House, 2003). 
In any type of emergency situation, a local government will attempt to handle the event 
with local resources and then request help from other jurisdictions (other counties, State 
or Federal). Local governments should have a system in place where the event is 
occurring, while State and Federal assets have to prepare and respond to the site of the 
emergency or outbreak after the fact. 
The HHS Plan is clear that local governments have primary responsibility for 
surveillance and healthcare in their community and can request help from the federal 
government when necessary (DHHS, 2005a). The federal government's job will be to 
coordinate with local governments in tracking and surveillance activities. Again the 
proposed budget does not match the importance of the activity. In the regular HHS 
budget, the Bush administration asked Congress for a decrease in local public health 
preparedness funding by $129 million, from $926 million to $797 million while asking 
for just $100 million in the pandemic preparedness budget (Brewin, 2005). $100 million 
for all of the public health departments in the country will not make much difference in 
improving surveillance or response, let alone help fund stockpiling of antiviral 
medications or increasing surge capacity. 
Vaccine and antiviral medications make up the bulk of the federal government's 
pandemic preparedness budget. In the HHS plan, vaccine and antiviral treatments seem 
to be one of many preparedness activities but by taking over half the proposed budget, it 
is clear the importance the federal government has placed on vaccines and antiviral 
medications. The Bush Administration's proposed budget provides $2.8 billion to 
producing vaccines more efficiently and quickly, $1.5 billion to purchase 50 million 
doses of a vaccine that does not exist and $1 billion to purchase and stockpile antiviral 
medications Tamiflu and Relenza (Brewin, 2005; Halliman, 2005). An organization of 
several professional associations called the Working Group on Pandemic Influenza has 
applauded the high level of funding into research and development of domestic vaccine 
production and the improvement of the vaccine production process. This expense is a 
true investment in the future and will provide benefit whether or not a pandemic occurs. 
The Working Group though points out that neither the HSS plan nor the budget provides 
details and a precise timeline for the development of a crash program for rapid vaccine 
development and production during a pandemic (Jeffery Levi, 2006). That investment in 
domestic vaccine production and new vaccine development techniques, while a good 
investment in the future, is being invested wholly in the private pharmaceutical industry. 
The government would still not be able to produce its own vaccines. 
The WHO plan recommends a country stockpile enough antiviral medications to 
treat 25% of the population; this would be 75 million people in the United States (WHO, 
2005). The current funding proposal will provide about 50 million doses to the national 
stockpile but the HHS plan to stockpile the remainder raises concerns. Rep. Nita Lowey 
(D-NY) has criticized the Bush administration's shift of the stockpile burden on the 
States. She has said, "This is a national emergency, it should not depend upon where one 
lives as to what sort of protection you get." (Halliman, 2005) By requiring States to 
purchase their own stockpile, it creates fifty more customers competing with each other 
for the limited production capability of the two pharmaceutical companies (UPMC, 
2005). So in addition to the increased responsibility of planning and preparing for a 
pandemic with less funding than last year, States will have to find other funding sources 
to purchase small stockpiles of both vaccines and antiviral medications. The Working 
Group estimates the States will have to come up with $510 million in a short time to meet 
this federal mandate (Jeffery Levi, 2006). Antiviral treatment has its drawbacks and is 
not thought by all to have the ability to impede the spread of the virus. An infected 
individual must start the dose pack within 48 hours of symptoms, which will be difficult 
if a prescription is required and pharmacy stock is questionable. Oseltamivir (Tamiflu) is 
only partially effective against the H5Nl virus and may be ineffective after mutation or 
resistant strains form (Gostin, 2006). 
Legal Maneuvering- Vaccine manufacturers are leveraging liability release with 
the government to speed development and production. The 1976 National Influenza 
Immunization Program debacle (Sencer, 2006) looms large over current vaccine 
manufacturers and immunity from liability has been raised as a step to increase 
production and development by the industry. The Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 
(VICP) exists in the United States but it is inadequate in its current form during a 
pandemic (Gostin, 2006; Jeffery Levi, 2006) The manner in which vaccines are 
regulated during a public health emergency may streamline the vaccine manufacturing 
process. To enable mass production with little lead time, the regulatory process to 
approve vaccines should be timely and efficient (Gostin, 2006). 
Antiviral manufacturers are fighting to keep their monopoly on their product, 
pursuant to copyright laws. The Trade-Related Aspects of intellectual Property Rights 
Agreement (TRIPS, Art. 31) (WTO, 2006) provides countries to grant compulsory 
licenses in a public health emergency. Hoffman-La Roche is resisting this practice even 
though they admit the global orders and WHO plan recommendations exceed their 
production capacity (Gostin, 2006). 
With the majority of the budget request from the White House being directed 
toward the pharmaceutical industry and work to remove any liability from the vaccine 
manufacturers, it appears that neither the public health infrastructure, healthcare 
infrastructure nor emergency preparedness are getting the funding in the pandemic flu 
budget. 
Vaccine Prioritization- An important issue in a national vaccine program is 
prioritization of vaccine recipients. Prioritization is not a new concept with influenza 
vaccines. During the 2004 season, a problem with a vaccine manufacturer caused a 
major shortage in the US seasonal vaccine supply. A prioritization was established to 
ration the vaccine to those who are most susceptible to influenza. This included the 
elderly, children 6-24 months old, and people who are immuno-suppressed (CDC, 2004). 
While the seasonal vaccine is made before the influenza season, using several past 
strains, a pandemic vaccine cannot be created until the pandemic strain is identified due 
to antigenic shift. A vaccine for every American would not be available for several 
months (DHHS, 2005a). To prepare for this, in 2005, the National Vaccine Advisory 
Committee and the Advisory Committee on hmnunization Practices unanimously 
approved a vaccine prioritization plan. Figure 4 below breaks down groups of the 
population into tiers, similar to the seasonal ration except for moving the healthcare 
workers to the top tier and other govermnent officials working in pandemic response into 
the first tier (Temte, 2006). The healthcare workforce is the first line of defense against a 
pandemic once it is here. The healthcare system will be overwhehned with patients and a 
healthy workforce will be required to keep it going. 
Figure 4 (Temte, 2006) 
PRIORITY GROUPS FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA VACCINE 
Here's a tier-by-tier breakdown of the vaccine prioritization plan approved in July 2005 by the 
National Vaccine Advisory Committee and the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices. 
• Health care workers with direct patient contact and critical health care support staff 
• Vaccine and antiviral manufacturing personnel 
! Iier•,'!ll I Highest-risk groups 
Tier3 
Iie.r4 
• Patients 65 and older with at least one high-risk condition 
• Patients 6 months to 64 years with at least two high-risk conditions 
• Patients hospitalized in the past year because of pneumonia, influenza or another 
high-risk condition 
Household contacts and pregnancy 
• Household contacts of children under 6 months 
"' Househoid contacts of severely immunocompromised individuals 
• Pregnant women 
Pandemic responders 
• Key government leaders and critical pandemic public health responders 
Other high-risk groups 
• Patients 65 and older with no high-risk conditions 
• Patients 6 months to 64 years with one high-risk condition 
• Children 6 months to 23 months 
Critical infrastructure groups 
• OthH public health emergency responders, public safety workers, utility workers, 
critical transportation workers and telecommunications workers 
• Other key government health care decision-makers 
• Individuals providing mortuary services 
• Healthy patients 2 to 64 years without any high-risk conditions 
During a potential pandemic crisis, why do those over 65 years old, with existing health 
problems have a higher priority than children, whose life is ahead and public health and 
EMS workers who are on the front line of health response? During war and mass 
casualty situations, those that have less probability of survival are not given priority over 
those with a higher chance of survival. This will be an issue for government to 
investigate and keep in miud if vaccine supplies are low and death rates are high. 
In a survey conducted by tbe Honolulu Emergency Services Department, 80% of 
doctors would report to work during a natural disaster but only 58% would during a 
contagious epidemic. Figure 5 below shows the complete results ofthe survey. 
Figure 5 (Huff, 2006) 
Besides first access to vaccines and antiviral medications, planning efforts should be 
made to increase both the ways to ensure staffs safety and increasing the surge capacity 
of the staff pool. 
Investments in the future, missing from the plan- Mentioned in the plan but 
lacking in funds to accomplish are investments in the infrastructure to the nation's 
healthcare system that can not only benefit the country during a pandemic but also during 
any other emergency or healthcare crisis. The nation's healthcare system is strapped 
every year during the seasonal influenza outbreaks while the HHS plan predicts anywhere 
from 865,000 to 9.9 million hospitalizations during a pandemic (Huff, 2006). Surge 
capacity must be improved to not only increase bed space but staff and medical 
equipment. The Strategic National Stockpile can only support so many incident locations 
with extra ventilators and medical supplies. The Stockpile, which operates under the 
CDC, is available to all States if local medical supplies are depleted (CDC, 2005). 
Operating under DHHS and DHS are Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs). 
These teams can drop into an affected area and set up a mobile hospital where needed 
(CA-l). Their weakness is they pull medical staff from one area and send them to 
another. If a pandemic affects the entire country, healthcare administrators will not allow 
their staff to be deployed, in fear of being understaffed themselves. The HHS plan calls 
for the creation of more mobile teams (DHHS, 2005a) but this is more of a band-aid than 
a solution . A mobile hospital will only supplement bed space, not the entire healthcare 
system. In 1918, the healthcare system was completely overwhelmed, from the hospitals 
to the druggist and everywhere in between. Fear of infection and actual influenza 
infection reduced the available healthcare staff available, as did the ongoing war effort. 
Efforts should be pushed toward strengthening the Medical Reserve Corps capacity to 
supplement healthcare staffing by using medical professionals in the community (MRC). 
The Medical Reserve Corps is part ofthe Citizen Corps system which reemerged after the 
9/11 terrorist attacks. Improvements to this system as well as the hospital surge capacity 
infrastructure are not part of the Bush administration's funding plan but would provide 
for a much better investment and provide longer lasting improved preparedness than any 
stockpile of antiviral medications ever could. 
The other serious weakness in the HHS plan is the lack of planning for a possible 
disruption of essential services during a pandemic. Either out of fear of infection, orders 
to stay at home to stop the spread or actual infection, employee absenteeism is expected 
to be high. This was experienced also during the 1918 pandemic (Schoch-Spana, 2000). 
This is not just a breakdown in law enforcement or postal delivery. It is possible there 
could be a disruption in the shipping industry, affecting food and fuel deliveries. No food 
on the shelves at the store and no fuel for vehicles could cause panic and starvation in an 
already stressed community. It will take a coordinated effort between local, state, federal 
and private industry to keep essential commodities flowing, while preventing the spread 
of the flu virus across the country. 
Last Line of Defense- Possibly the most important part of halting the spread of a 
pandemic is personal preparedness. There are certain actions people can take to prepare 
themselves and their family for the potential pandemic and during a pandemic both to 
protect themselves and others. People must be informed about the signs and symptoms 
as well as what actions they can take to prevent transmission and if infected to reduce the 
possibility of passing it to family and others. HHS has prepared information for the 
public that can be found at www.pandemicflu.gov (DHHS). On this site, there are 
personal preparedness checklists that are clear in what citizens can do to prepare 
themselves and their family for a pandemic and the affect it could have on their life. 
HHS needs to take this resource a step further and find ways to get this information out to 
those both without internet access and those who do not even know there is a threat. 
Education and improvements to personal preparedness is also an investment in the future 
and will have an impact in all aspects of emergency preparedness. 
The H5Nl Avian influenza virus has the potential to cause a pandemic in humans 
but when and where that will happen is a mystery. Government officials from top to 
bottom have added a pandemic to their list of hot topics to prepare for. DHHS has 
released their plan to prepare the country for this threat and has made clear through its 
budget requests, what they feel is most important to protect the citizens. What is missing 
is an investment in the local communities and healthcare system to increase surge 
capacity and a clear plan to sustain essential services. While improvements to vaccine 
production both domestic and internationally are important and is an excellent 
investment, surge capacity building and local preparedness will provide a benefit to the 
public for all types of emergencies and disasters. 
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